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Abstract
We develop an endogenous growth model with R&D spillovers to study the long run
consequences of o⁄shoring with ￿rm heterogeneity and incomplete contracts. In so doing,
we model o⁄shoring as the geographical fragmentation of a ￿rm￿ s production chain between
a home upstream division and a foreign downstream one. While there is always a positive
correlation between upstream bargaining weight and o⁄shoring activities, there is an inverted
U-shaped relationship between these and growth. Whether o⁄shoring with incomplete con-
tracts also increases consumption depends on ￿rm heterogeneity. As for welfare, whereas
with complete contracts an R&D subsidy is enough to solve the ine¢ ciency due to R&D
spillovers, with incomplete contracts a production subsidy is also needed.
Keywords: o⁄shoring, heterogeneous ￿rms, incomplete contracts, industry dynamics,
growth.
J.E.L. Classi￿cation: D23, F23, L23, O31, O43.
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1I Introduction
O⁄shoring, along with debates and literature related to it, has enjoyed an exponential growth
in recent years. In particular, the controversy on the issue exploded in February 2004 when
N. Gregory Mankiw rationalized o⁄shoring through its long term positive consequences on
the US economy. He argued that o⁄shoring may release domestic resources that can be re-
allocated to the creation of new products, new technologies and thus new and better jobs
to replace those lost to cheaper foreign countries.2 Trade economists have since rushed to
support. Blinder (2006) calls o⁄shoring the third industrial revolution, which can eventually
be a sound occurrence for all workers, as the ￿rst and the second were regardless of initial
skepticism. Baldwin (2006) calls the process "a second unbundling" that has occurred as a
consequence of rapidly falling communication and coordination costs. Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008) argue how traditional trade theory must give way for a paradigm more
relevant to today￿ s world, namely trade in "tasks". They show the bene￿ts of this phenom-
enon by pointing out its positive impact on real wages of all workers in the home country.3
Finally, Rodriguez-Clare (2009) uses a dynamic model to show that the negative terms of
trade e⁄ect of o⁄shoring is outweighed by long-run gains as the origin country adjusts its
research e⁄ort.
2O⁄shoring is frequently blamed by workers and trade unions for the slow pace of job growth in the United
States and for the swelling wage di⁄erential between low and high skill workers (Feenstra and Hanson, 2001).
3In their contribution, the positive e⁄ect of o⁄shoring on wages is driven by a productivity e⁄ect as
o⁄shoring translates into a form of technological progress. These results are quali￿ed in Kohler (2004) and
in Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007), where domestic workers only bene￿t if the labor cost savings of
o⁄shoring are associated with the labor intensive sector.
2Our aim is to contribute to this debate by highlighting possible gains and losses from
o⁄shoring in an endogenous growth scenario with heterogeneous ￿rms where the economic
bene￿ts of research and development (R&D) are not fully appropriable by innovators and
some of the contracts supporting production abroad are incomplete.
We develop our argument by modeling an economy consisting of two countries, North and
South, and two sectors, production and R&D. The North is the market for ￿nal products,
which are horizontally di⁄erentiated. Varieties are supplied according to blueprints that
are invented and patented by R&D labs. In the wake of Grossman and Helpman (1991),
endogenous growth is introduced through a positive learning externality in R&D.
To enter the production market, entrepreneurs must ￿rst purchase a patent, and then
engage in process innovation with uncertain outcome to ￿nd their capacity in using the
patent. In particular, an entrepreneur￿ s capacity is determined by a random draw from
some common productivity distribution as in Melitz (2003). Each entrepreneur organizes
production along a vertical chain consisting of two stages, intermediate supply ("upstream")
and ￿nal assembly ("downstream"), performed by two divisions within a vertically integrated
￿rm. Vertical integration is due to the presence of tacit knowledge that cannot be transmitted
outside ￿rm boundaries. Both R&D and ￿nal assembly are assumed to take place in North
only. Intermediates can be produced in North or South. This is assumed to be a potential site
for the production of intermediates using a standardized traditional technology that o⁄ers
productivity gains to entrepreneurs with bad draws, provided that they are willing to bear
the additional trade costs associated with international shipments.4 We call "inshoring" an
4Using Japanese ￿rm level data from the period 1994-2000, Hijzen, Inui, and Todo (2007) give empirical
evidence on how the scope for productivity improvements from o⁄shoring depends negatively on the initial
3organizational structure in which both production stages take place in North and "o⁄shoring"
the alternative organizational structure in which intermediates are ￿rst produced in South
and then assembled in North.
The two countries di⁄er in terms of the quality of contract enforcement between divisions.
Speci￿cally, contracts are complete when both the upstream and the downstream divisions
are located in North. They are incomplete when the upstream division is located in South
due to the lack of credible institutions to perfectly enforce contracts.5 We model contrac-
tual incompleteness following recent contributions that study ￿rms￿ownership and location
choices in environments in which economic interactions su⁄er from hold up problems.6 More
precisely, we follow Grossman and Helpman (2002) in adopting the transaction cost approach
￿ la Williamson (1975, 1985), whose key idea is that the quality of deliverables in a bilateral
transaction is unobservable by third parties so that, after the deliverables have been pro-
duced, the stakeholders involved in the transaction have to bargain on some division of the
surplus it would generate.7 However, by assuming that upstream-downstream transactions
level of productivity of the ￿rm. This in turn provides an e⁄ective channel for less productive ￿rms to catch
up and restore competitiveness.
5Nunn (2007) for instance uses several proxies to measure contract incompleteness in the South: a weighed
average of a number of variables that measure individuals￿perceptions of the e⁄ectiveness and predictability
of the judiciary and the enforcement of contracts in 159 countries between 1997 and 1998 from Kaufmann
et al. (2003); the measures of judicial quality and contract enforcement from Gwartney and Lawson (2003)
and World Bank (2004).
6See Helpman (2006) for a survey.
7See, e.g., Antr￿s (2003) and Antr￿s and Helpman (2004) for the alternative property-rights approach
to model incomplete contracts and hold up problems ￿ la Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore
(1990) .
4take place within the boundaries of ￿rms, we abstract from the ownership decision and focus,
instead, on the location decision. In other words, what generates contractual incompleteness
is not the crossing of ￿rms￿boundaries but rather the crossing of countries￿borders.
This setup generates new insights on the dynamic and static aggregate e⁄ects of o⁄shoring.
We show that, when contracts are incomplete, the possibility of o⁄shoring has favorable
implications for economic growth. That does not happen when contracts are complete, in
which case o⁄shoring has no impact whatsoever on growth. The key parameter regulating
the growth e⁄ect of o⁄shoring with incomplete contracts is the bargaining power of upstream
divisions. In particular, we show that, the relationship between the growth rate of the
economy and the bargaining weight of upstream divisions takes an inverted U-shape. While a
marginal increase in the bargaining power of upstream divisions always encourages more ￿rms
to o⁄shore, it fosters growth only if the initial value is su¢ ciently small. Otherwise, o⁄shoring
activities encouraged by a stronger upstream bargaining power slow growth. Lastly, we
show that whether o⁄shoring with incomplete contracts also favors steady state consumption
depends on ￿rm heterogeneity. For example, when productivity draws are Pareto distributed,
consumption increases when there are a lot of unproductive ￿rms and very few productive
ones.
Just like in Grossman and Helpman (1991), with o⁄shoring under complete contracts
the endogenous growth rate of the economy is suboptimally low due the positive learning
externality in R&D. In this case, e¢ ciency is restored through a subsidy to R&D only. This
is, instead, not enough under incomplete contracts as the hold up problem causes underpro-
duction. Accordingly, with incomplete contracts, the R&D subsidy has to be complemented
5by a production subsidy to o⁄shored upstream divisions.8
To the best of our knowledge, our analysis represents the ￿rst attempt to study the
long run consequences of o⁄shoring with ￿rm heterogeneity and incomplete contracts. A
large branch of the international trade literature on ￿rm organization has been devoted to
the incomplete nature of contracts in arrangements between ￿rms. On the dynamic side of
this front, Naghavi and Ottaviano (2006, 2008, 2009) use a growth model ￿ la Grossman
and Helpman (1991) to study the potential tension that may arise between the static and
dynamic implications of the fragmentation of production. They ￿nd that while outsourcing
gives rise to complementary upstream and downstream innovation, incomplete contracts may
prevent static gains of specialized production from carrying through in the long run. They
also ￿nd that o⁄shoring can slow growth by reducing the feedback from o⁄shored plants
to labs. Yet, in their model there is no ￿rm heterogeneity so that, in equilibrium, ￿rms
either all outsource or they all vertically integrate.9 Grossman and Helpman (2004), Antr￿s
and Helpman (2004) and Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2005) are among the ￿rst papers
to study the organization of ￿rms in the presence of heterogeneity in a static set up. Our
contribution adds to this literature by studying the industry dynamics of ￿rm organization,
in particular the interactions between o⁄shoring and growth.10 Our model also di⁄ers from
8This stresses a novel reason to support FDI that supplements those already highlighted in the literature.
See, e.g., Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004, Ch.10).
9The same is true in the Ricardian growth model by Ottaviano (2009).
10The only other growth models with heterogeneous ￿rms to our knowledge are Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud
(2008) and Segerstrom and Gusta⁄son (2009), which explore the impact of trade liberalization on growth in
the presence of heterogeneous ￿rms. These papers, however, do not investigate the impact of contractual
incompleteness.
6previous work on the organizational choices of heterogeneous ￿rms as we do not apply the
typical extra ￿xed cost that generally leads more productive ￿rms to undertake a more costly
form of organization. This helps us avert potential misleading assumptions as it is not clear
how ￿xed costs can be ranked across organizational forms.11
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
characterizes the market equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the interactions between o⁄shoring,
innovation and economic growth. Section 5 highlights the role of contractual incompleteness
in determining the long run e⁄ects of o⁄shoring. Section 6 concludes.
II A Dynamic Model of O⁄shoring
The economy consists of two countries, North and South. We assume that all workers and
consumers belong to the North but can be employed in South as expatriates to work in the
o⁄shored plants. Hence the South is simply a potential production site. This emphasizes the
tacitness of knowledge by ruling out perfect substitutability of Southern labor for Northern
labor, with the intention of abstracting from typical labor market debates on wages that
have been widely studied empirically and are being widely studied theoretically parallel to
the writing of this paper.12 This helps single out the additional impacts of o⁄shoring on
growth in the home country that have often been neglected in the literature. In addition,
observed empirical evidence does not always approve of the phenomenon of one job shifted
11For instance, Antr￿s and Helpman (2004) assume that ￿xed costs of vertical integration are larger while
Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2005) suppose that outsourcing ￿xed costs are more substantial.
12For recent theoretical analyses of o⁄shoring as means of trade and its e⁄ects on real wages see Baldwin
and Robert-Nicoud (2007), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Rodriguez-Clare (2009).
7abroad being immediately one job released at home.13
Overview and timing of events
Before getting into the details of the model, it is useful to provide a brief overview of
the way it works. Consumers have CES preferences over a horizontally di⁄erentiated good
C. The production of each variety of good C requires a blueprint, an intermediate input
and assembly. Blueprints are created by independent R&D labs that sell their blueprints to
entrepreneurs. All labs operate in North. An entrepreneur discovers her ability to turn the
acquired blueprint in a sellable product only after buying. Her ability is determined by a
random productivity draw. Upon observing its productivity ’, the entrepreneur organizes
her ￿rm as a vertical value chain with an "upstream" division producing the intermediate
input and a "downstream" division turning it into the ￿nal product. While ￿nal production
takes place in North, the ￿rm can either "inshore" intermediate production in North, using
its own technology, or "o⁄shore" it to South using a cost-reducing standardized technology.
In this way, o⁄shoring o⁄ers a viable alternative to the least e¢ cient ￿rms only. This alter-
native comes with strings attached. On the one hand, shipping intermediates from South
to North incurs trade costs. On the other hand, o⁄shoring takes place under contractual
incompleteness, which generates further costs due to ex post bargaining.
To summarize, in each period t the following sequence of events take place. First, indepen-
dent labs engage in R&D to create new patented blueprints. Second, entrepreneurs enter by
purchasing a blueprint, realize their productivity levels in terms of non-standardized produc-
tion and choose the location of upstream divisions. Third, upstream divisions manufacture
13See for instance Debande (2006) for the US and Japanese cases.
8the inputs needed by their downstream counterparts. Fourth, once intermediate production is
completed, the upstream and downstream divisions of producers that have o⁄shored bargain
over the share of total revenues from ￿nal sales and inputs are handed over by the former to
the latter. Lastly, ￿nal assembly takes place and ￿nal products are sold to households.
Demand side
There are L in￿nitely-lived households with identical preferences de￿ned over the con-
sumption of a horizontally di⁄erentiated good C. The utility function is assumed to be
















is a CES quantity index in which c(i;t) is the consumption of variety i, n(t) is the number of
available varieties of good C, and ￿ is the own and cross demand elasticity of any variety, and
thus an inverse measure of the degree of product di⁄erentiation between varieties. Households
have perfect foresight and they can borrow and lend freely in a perfect capital market at
instantaneous interest rate R(t).
Using multi-stage budgeting to solve their utility maximization problem, households ￿rst
allocate their income ￿ ow between savings and expenditures. This yields a time path of total




= R(t) ￿ ￿ (2)
9where we have used the fact that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution equals unity. By









Households then allocate their expenditures across all varieties, which yields the instan-
taneous demand function
c(i;t) = A(t)p(i;t)
￿￿ i 2 [0;n(t)] (4)




is aggregate demand. Throughout the rest of the paper, we leave the time dependence of
variables implicit when this does not generate confusion.
Supply side
There are two factors of production in the economy. Labor is inelastically supplied by
households and each household supplies one unit of labor so that we can use L to refer both to
the number of households and the total endowment of labor. Labor is freely mobile between
countries and it is chosen as numeraire. The other factor is knowledge capital in the form of
blueprints for the production of di⁄erentiated varieties. Blueprints are protected by in￿nitely
lived patents and depreciate at a constant rate ￿.
There are two sectors, innovation (R&D) and production. Perfectly competitive labs
invent blueprints for the production of the di⁄erentiated varieties. The production of each
10variety requires a single blueprint and consists of an upstream and a downstream stage.
Entrepreneurs enter by buying the rights to use the blueprints and split their activities
between an upstream division supplying intermediates and a downstream division assembling
them. Assembly takes place only in North whereas intermediate inputs can be produced
also in South using an older standardized traditional technology ("o⁄shoring"). Southern
production takes place through a standardized traditional technology, which allows one unit
of labor to produce ’f > 0 units of intermediates.
Shipping the intermediate inputs back to the North for assembly incurs iceberg trade costs:
￿ > 1 units must be shipped for one unit to reach destination. Trade costs can be embedded
into the productivity parameter of the South without loss of generality. Hence, throughout
the rest of the paper, we will use ’o = ’f=￿ to denote the standard southern technology
inclusive of trade costs. Northern production can rely on new advanced technologies that are
generated by process innovation. This is a risky endeavor as long as its outcome is uncertain
and the property rights on patents have to be bought in advance before experimenting new
production processes. Speci￿cally, after buying the rights to use the blueprints from labs,
producers randomly draw their productivity level ’ from a continuous cumulative distribution
G(’) with support [0;1) so that o⁄shoring o⁄ers productivity gains to producers with bad
draws ’ < ’o. Final assembly in turn needs one unit of the intermediate component for
each unit of the ￿nal good no matter where intermediates originate from. Intermediates are
variety-speci￿c: once produced for a certain assembly line, they have no alternative use.
O⁄shoring is associated with contractual costs that arise from weak legal institutions
in the South. Speci￿cally, only high quality variety-speci￿c intermediates can be processed
whereas low quality ones are useless even though supplied at zero cost. Contracts between
11the upstream and the downstream divisions are complete when both are located in North,
but incomplete when the upstream division is o⁄shored to South. In this case the quality
of intermediates can not be assessed by third parties. That generates a hold up problem:
after the upstream division has supplied its speci￿c input, it has to reach an agreement with
the downstream division on how to share the joint surplus (revenues) from ￿nal sales. The
agreement is reached through Nash bargaining and we denote the bargaining weight of the
upstream division by !.
Finally, we introduce endogenous growth by assuming that R&D faces a learning curve
so that the marginal R&D cost of blueprints decreases with the number of blueprints that
have been successfully introduced in the past. Speci￿cally, the invention of a new blueprint
requires k=n units of labor where k > 0 is a parameter and n is the total number of blueprints
that have already been patented.14 Given the chosen functional form, some initial stock of
implemented blueprints n0 > 0 is needed to have ￿nite costs of innovation at all times. We
assume that this stock belongs to North.
III Market Equilibrium
Production
At time t the instantaneous equilibrium is found by solving the model backwards from
14The assumed shape of the learning curve serves analytical solvability and the comparison with Grossman
and Helpman (1991). In equilibrium it yields a ￿ size e⁄ect￿ , meaning that larger countries grow faster. To
avoid this this prediction that runs against the empirical evidence, one could assume that the intensity of
the learning spillover is lower, i.e. k=n￿ with 0 < ￿ < 1 (Jones, 1995). This would turn our setup into a
quasi-endogenous growth model in the wake of Segerstrom (1998).
12￿nal production to R&D. Varieties can be sold to ￿nal customers by two types of producers:
"inshorers" have both divisions in North whereas "o⁄shorers" have their upstream divisions
in South and their downstream ones in North. Under inshoring, as contracts are complete,
the upstream and downstream divisions of the same ￿rm ￿rst maximize the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t and
then share it according to their bargaining weights. This implies that the upstream division of
a producer with labor productivity ’ selects intermediate output x(’) to maximize operating
pro￿t ￿v(’) = rv(’)=￿ = pv(’)yv(’)=￿ where rv(’), pv(’) and yv(’) are ￿nal revenues, ￿nal
price and ￿nal output (itself equal to intermediate production). Given the demand curve (4),






with associated output xv(’) = yv(’) = Apv(’)￿￿ and operating pro￿t ￿v(’) = rv(’)=￿ =
Apv(’)1￿￿=￿. A share ! of ￿v(’) goes to the upstream division and the rest to the down-
stream one.
Under o⁄shoring, the producer uses the standardized technology with upstream labor
productivity ’o and gets the joint surplus of its divisions under incomplete contracts. This
surplus is given by the revenues from ￿nal sales and is divided between divisions through
ex post Nash bargaining. Absent any outside option, revenues are therefore split according
to the bargaining weights of the two parties with a share (1 ￿ !) going to the downstream
division and the remaining share ! going to the upstream one. The upstream division decides
how much input xo to produce anticipating that bargaining outcome. Hence, it maximizes
￿u = !poyo￿xo=’o where po and yo are ￿nal price and ￿nal output (itself equal to intermediate






with associated output xo = yo = Ap￿￿
o and revenues ro = poyo = Ap1￿￿
o .15 A share
￿d = (1 ￿ !)ro goes to the downstream division while the complementary share goes to the
upstream one. Accordingly, after subtracting labor costs, the upstream division is left with
￿u = !ro=￿: larger upstream bargaining weight and stronger product di⁄erentiation shift
a larger share of a given joint surplus ro from downstream to upstream divisions. Hence,
the overall operating pro￿t of the o⁄shorer is ￿o = ￿d + ￿u = [1 + (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ !)]ro=￿.16
Since the downstream division does not contribute anything before the bargaining stage, the
joint surplus ro (and the joint pro￿t ￿o as well) is at its maximum when ! goes to one. In
other words, when ! goes to one, the incomplete contract outcome converges to the complete
contract one.
As producers can freely choose between inshoring and o⁄shoring, the operating pro￿ts
they earn are equal to ￿(’) ￿ max[￿v(’);￿o]: The fact that ￿v(’) is an increasing function
of productivity ’ implies that there exists a unique threshold productivity level ("cuto⁄")
15The upstream division does not face an incentive constraint as the optimal output is always positive.
16For the upstream division the adverse incentive due to ex post bargaining under incomplete contracts
has exactly the same impact as an iceberg trade cost that melts a fraction (1 ￿ !) of intermediate output
shipped from South to North, and therefore does not generate revenues for that division. The fact that
here the fraction (1 ￿ !) of revenues is recovered by the downstream division explains why the overall
operating pro￿t of the o⁄shorer is larger than that of the simple iceberg case. Note that, if the ￿rm instead
outsourced upstream production outside its boundaries, its operating pro￿ts would only amount to ￿d, just
as in Grossman and Helpman (2002). As we discussed in the Introduction, we rule out this possibility in
order to focus on location decisions only.
14’￿ above which producers prefer to inshore. This cuto⁄ solves ￿v(’￿) = ￿o and is therefore
equal to
’
￿ = (!’o)[1 + (1 ￿ !)(￿ ￿ 1)]
1
￿￿1 (6)
The cuto⁄ is decreasing in ￿ because weaker product di⁄erentiation shifts surplus from up-
stream to downstream divisions exacerbating intermediate underproduction and thus pro-
moting inshoring. For symmetric reasons, the cuto⁄is increasing in the upstream bargaining
weight !. It is also increasing in ’o as o⁄shoring is fostered by any improvement in the
productivity of the standardized technology ’s or any fall in trade cost ￿.
We can therefore highlight:
Proposition 1 A marginal increase in the bargaining weight of upstream divisions encour-
ages more ￿rms to o⁄shore.
Since 1=(!’o) is the amount of labor embedded in unit revenues, it will turn out to be
useful to denote by e ’o ￿ !’o the "delivered" productivity of o⁄shored labor. We will call
this simply "o⁄shored productivity" and we will contrast it with producer-speci￿c "inshored
productivity" ’. Note that (6) shows that a marginal producer drawing exactly ’￿ has higher
inshored than o⁄shored productivity (’￿ > e ’o) so that the range (e ’o;’￿) identi￿es producers
whose decisions to o⁄shore reduce aggregate productivity. Moreover, due to @’￿=@! > 0,
the cuto⁄ ’￿ achieves its maximum value ’o at ! equal to 1, so any other value of ! implies
’￿ < ’o. Hence, incomplete contracts generate two adverse e⁄ects of o⁄shoring on aggregate
productivity. First, ￿rms drawing values of ’ between e ’o and ’￿ o⁄shore while they have
higher inshored productivity. Second, ￿rms drawing values between ’￿ and ’o do not o⁄shore
whereas in the absence of contractual frictions doing so would increase their productivity. In
15Figure 1 we call these adverse e⁄ects penalization 1 and penalization 2 respectively. Indeed,
when ! is equal to 1, (6) implies ’￿ = e ’o = ’o so that all ￿rms with a productivity level
’ < ’o o⁄shore and their decision to do so improves aggregate productivity.






























At the innovation stage, labs invent new blueprints at a marginal cost that depends on









n ￿ dn=dt, LI is labor employed in inventing new blueprints, n=k is its productivity
and ￿ is the rate of depreciation.
Due to learning, as innovation cumulates, it becomes increasingly cheaper to introduce
new blueprints and, being priced at marginal cost, their value falls through time. Speci￿cally,






Labs pay their researchers by borrowing at the interest rate R and know that the re-
sulting patents will generate instantaneous dividends equal to the expected pro￿ts of the
corresponding producers ￿. Arbitrage in the capital market then requires the dividends ￿
and capital gains
￿
J to match interest payments RJ and depreciation ￿J so that:







where the equality is granted by the de￿nition of J.
Aggregation
In characterizing the aggregate behavior of our heterogeneous economy, we follow Melitz























is the average (output weighted) productivity of inshorers. Since ’￿ > e ’o, we have e ’v > ’￿ >
e ’o, e ’v > e ’ > e ’oand de ’v=d’￿ > 0. Figure 1 shows a ranking of the productivity levels.17
Figure 1 about here
We also de￿ne Eo as the share of expenditures going to o⁄shorers, and Po and Co as the
corresponding exact price and quantity indices such that PoCo = Eo. Analogously, we de￿ne
Ev as the share of expenditures going to inshorers, and Pv and Cv as the corresponding exact






, Pv = fn[1 ￿ G(’
￿)]g
1















, Po = fnG(’
￿)g
1






























Since producers discover their productivity only after acquiring the right to use a patented
blueprint, the dividends they are willing to pay to labs equal their expected operating pro￿ts
￿ = G(’
￿)￿o + [1 ￿ G(’
￿)]e ￿v (12)
where, since ro = Eo=[nG(’￿)], the operating pro￿t of a typical o⁄shorer ￿o can be rewritten
in terms of aggregate variables as
￿o =
[1 + (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ !)]Eo
￿nG(’￿)

















where ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ !)Eo=E is the share of aggregate expenditures accruing to the downstream
divisions of o⁄shorers. Since downstream divisions do not make any relation speci￿c invest-
ment before bargaining, ￿ can be seen as a su¢ cient statistics for "aggregate distortions"
in the economy due to contractual incompleteness. It depends both of the magnitude of the
distortion for each o⁄shorer (1 ￿ !) and the share of o⁄shorers in the economy Eo=E.
Expression (13) shows that expected pro￿ts are an increasing function of ￿. When a
higher share of expenditures in the economy goes to o⁄shorers, expected pro￿ts are larger in
18the industry. This can be explained by the fact that larger aggregate distortions increase the
economy￿ s price index, thus softening competitive pressure. The positive impact of ￿ on ￿
is an increasing function of ￿: the weaker product di⁄erentiation is, the bigger the e⁄ect of
relaxing competitive pressure.18







[1 + (￿ ￿ 1)￿] ￿
_ n
n
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (14)
Labor market clearing
Aggregate labor endowment L is absorbed by innovation (LI) as well as by inshored
and o⁄shored upstream production. Inshorers￿and o⁄shorers￿employment levels amount to
Lv = Ev=(e pve ’v) and Lo = Eo=(po’o) respectively. Accordingly, given (11), total employment
in upstream production simpli￿es to




which, together with (8), allows us to rewrite the labor market clearing condition L =










E(1 ￿ ￿) (15)
Employment in production is a decreasing function of the share ￿ of aggregate expenditures
accruing to the downstream divisions of o⁄shorers. This is the dual of the previously dis-
cussed result that expected pro￿ts increase with ￿ as long as larger expected pro￿ts induce
a reallocation of labor from production to R&D.
18Inshores have a higher sensitivity to the elasticity of substitution as with o⁄shoring all variable costs of
producing intermediates are passed over to upstream suppliers. See Grossman and Helpman (2002, p. 102)
for more detail.
19IV O⁄shoring and Growth
The market clearing conditions (14) and (15) de￿ne a dynamic system in two unknowns: the
growth rate of the stock of patents (
:
n=n) and the expenditures level (E). A unique balanced
growth path exists along which these variables are constant and is achieved without any
transition dynamics.19 Calling the corresponding growth rate and expenditures level by gs
and Es respectively, then imposing
￿
n=n = gs, E = Es and
￿
















(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿, Es = L + ￿k (16)
While expenditures Es do not depend on ￿, the growth rate gs is instead an increasing
function of ￿. The reason is that, by de￿nition, a rise in ￿ shifts expenditures from inshorers
to o⁄shorers. This shift, as discussed above, generates larger expected pro￿ts and smaller
employment in production. The resulting reallocation of labor from production to R&D
promotes innovation and growth.
Since Es does not depend on ￿, the bargaining weight ! does not a⁄ect expenditures.
It a⁄ects, however, the growth rate but in a non-monotonic way. To see this, remember
that, as ! goes to 1, we obtain the complete contract solution because aggregate distortions
disappear (￿ = 0). On the other hand, as ! goes to zero, the price of o⁄shorers po becomes
in￿nitely high, thus driving Eo to zero, so that also in this extreme case aggregate distortions
disappear as nobody o⁄shores (￿ = 0). For intermediate values of ! 2 (0;1), ￿ is instead
strictly positive.
Since dgs=d￿ > 0, the sign of the impact of ! on gs depends on the sign of d￿=d!. This
19See Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch.3) for details.
20can be decomposed as:
d￿
d!




where so ￿ Eo=E. Here, two opposing e⁄ects of ! on aggregate distortions create a non-
monotonic behaviour. The direct e⁄ect of larger ! on ￿ is negative (￿rst term on the RHS)
as it identi￿es the corresponding fall in the share of expenditures accruing to the downstream
divisions of o⁄shorers while holding the overall share of expenditures accruing to o⁄shorers
constant. It captures a pure surplus reallocation between divisions as a higher upstream
bargaining weight transfers surplus from downstream to o⁄shored upstream divisions. This
reduces expected pro￿ts and therefore growth. The indirect e⁄ect is positive (second term
on the RHS) as it identi￿es the increase in the overall share of expenditures accruing to
o⁄shorers due to an increase in both the relative number of o⁄shorers ("extensive margin")
and their relative size ("intensive margin"). These increase expected pro￿ts and therefore
growth. When ! is small, the indirect e⁄ect dominates the direct e⁄ect whereas the opposite
happens for large !.
Hence, we can state:20
Proposition 2 There is an inverted U-shaped relation between the growth rate of the econ-
omy and the bargaining weight of upstream divisions.
To sum up, Proposition 1 tells us that a higher bargaining weight of upstream divisions
unambiguosly promotes o⁄shoring. Proposition 2 tells us that this rise of o⁄shoring stimulates
growth as long as that bargaining weight is not too large.
As for productivity, Figure 1 shows the e⁄ect of an increase in ! on the productivity
20See the Appendix for a formal proof.
21distribution of ￿rms graphically. Larger ! directly raises e ’o, while it reduces [1 ￿ G(’￿)] e ’v
through a change in ’￿. This makes the change in average productivity e ’ ambiguous in !,
yet inferior to the rise in e ’o. Also, the productivity range along which o⁄shoring raises
aggregate productivity increases if the change in the intensive margin is larger than that in
the extensive margin (@e ’o=@! > @’￿=@!) so that the two values converge, and falls if the
opposite holds so that they diverge.
From a di⁄erent angle, Proposition 2 also tells us that making o⁄shoring possible a⁄ects
the growth rate of the economy only if contracts are incomplete. The reason is that, under
incomplete contracts, o⁄shoring augments the pro￿tability of R&D more than the pro￿tabil-
ity of production. As a result, when ￿rms o⁄shore there is a reallocation of labor from
production to R&D. Di⁄erently, with complete contracts o⁄shoring evenly augments both
the pro￿tability of R&D and the pro￿tability of production. As a result, when ￿rms o⁄shore
there is no reallocation of labor between R&D and production. All that happens is that more
e¢ cient labor generates more output (more on this below).
V Contracts and Welfare
So far we have looked at the e⁄ects of o⁄shoring on growth. The aim of this section is twofold.
First, we want to characterize also its e⁄ects on consumption. This will highlight the role of
￿rm heterogeneity. Second, we want to highlight how incomplete contracts lead to di⁄erent
policy implications with respect to complete contracts.
Consumption
To better understand the role of contractual incompleteness for consumption, it is useful
22to study again the two extreme cases in which hold up is not an issue (￿ = 1): one in which
o⁄shoring is inhibited (Eo = 0) and the other in which o⁄shoring takes place under complete
contracts (! = 1).
In both cases at the aggregate level the model with heterogeneous ￿rms is homomorphic
to a model with homogeneous ￿rms ￿ la Grossman and Helpman (1991) in which all ￿rms
are identical to the average heterogeneous ￿rm. Accordingly, average productivity (and
ultimately the productivity cuto⁄) provides a su¢ cient statistic to describe the aggregate








due to the fact that, by de￿nition, no entrepreneurs relies on the foreign standardized tech-
nology. On the other hand, when o⁄shoring is allowed for and contracts are complete, average














where from (6) we have ’￿
c = ’o > ’￿ > e ’o as the productivity cuto⁄ under contractual













In both cases, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), e¢ ciency in production is immaterial
for steady state growth and expenditures because it conveys equal incentives to production
and innovation. As a result, steady state growth and expenditures are the same. In addition,
steady state expenditures are also the same as those with incomplete contracts.
23Average productivity a⁄ects, instead, the aggregate quantities consumed in the various





e ’h (L + ￿k), Dc =
￿ ￿ 1
￿
e ’c (L + ￿k), Ds =
￿ ￿ 1
￿
e ’s (L + ￿k) (19)
where, for notational symmetry, we use e ’s to relabel the average productivity (10) that
prevails with incomplete o⁄shoring contracts. Comparing the two complete contract sce-
narios, we see that the fact that less e¢ cient ￿rms o⁄shore for ’ < ’o implies e ’c > e ’h
and thus Dc > Dh. Hence, as already argued, making o⁄shoring possible under contractual
completeness generates (only) a static welfare gain due to more production.
The e⁄ect of o⁄shoring is, instead, ambiguous under incomplete contracts. Indeed, we
have shown in Section 3 that incomplete contracts generate two adverse e⁄ects of o⁄shoring
on aggregate productivity. First, ￿rms drawing values of ’ between e ’o and ’￿ o⁄shore while
they have higher inshored productivity. This does not happen under complete contracts for
which we have e ’o = ’￿. Second, ￿rms drawing values between ’￿ and ’o do not o⁄shore
whereas in the absence of contractual frictions doing so would increase their productivity.
These adverse e⁄ects imply e ’s < e ’c and, therefore, Ds < Dc so that with o⁄shoring output
is always higher under complete than incomplete contracts.
Di⁄erently, when it comes to comparing o⁄shoring under contractual incompleteness and
no o⁄shoring only the ￿rst adverse e⁄ect is relevant as ￿rms with productivity levels be-
tween ’￿ and ’o do not o⁄shore in either case. The ranking in terms of output is therefore


















that is if the cumulated productivity gain of o⁄shores that are less productive under inshoring
(0 < ’ < e ’o) is larger than the cumulated productivity loss for o⁄shorers that are more
productive under inshoring (e ’o < ’ < ’￿).
These results allow us to state the following:
Proposition 3 Making o⁄shoring possible under contractual incompleteness generates static
welfare gains if the cumulated productivity gains of o⁄shores that would be less productive
under inshoring are larger than the cumulated productivity losses of o⁄shorers that would be
more productive under inshoring.
Whether this is indeed the case or not clearly depends on the way G(’) distributes the
productivity draws ’ between the two intervals (0; e ’o) and (e ’o;’￿). This highlights the cru-
cial role of heterogeneity. For example, if ’ is Pareto distributed with G(’) = 1￿(’M)
k ’￿k,
then e ’s > e ’h whenever k < (￿ ￿ 1)=[2 + (1 ￿ !)(￿ ￿ 1)]. In other words, with incomplete
contracts o⁄shoring also generates static gains when there are a lot of unproductive ￿rms
and few productive ones.
Optimal policy
We are now ready to investigate how incomplete contracts lead to di⁄erent policy impli-
cations with respect to complete contracts when the objective is to implement an e¢ cient
outcome maximizing (1) subject to the aggregate resource constraint without any hold up
problem. The e¢ cient outcome is readily characterized by remembering again that, with com-
plete contracts, at the aggregate level the model with heterogeneous ￿rms is homomorphic to
25a model with homogeneous ￿rms in which all ￿rms are identical to the average heterogeneous
￿rm. We can, therefore, invoke the results in Grossman and Helpman (1991) to assert that




￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿ ￿ ￿, Ew = Eh = Ec = Es (20)
with quantity consumed Dw = Dc.
The comparison between gs and gw shows that, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), due
to the positive learning externality in R&D, at the market outcome with complete contracts
our economy grows too slowly. In this case, optimal intervention then requires an R&D
subsidy that equalizes gh = gc to gw. Speci￿cally, if we call ￿
r
w the optimal fraction of R&D





gw + ￿ + ￿
With incomplete contracts the R&D subsidy alone is not enough due to the underpro-
duction of the intermediate input and, therefore, of the ￿nal output. Optimal intervention
here requires the government to subsidize also o⁄shorers￿upstream production. If we call ￿
p
w




w = 1 ￿ ! (21)
Hence, both R&D and production subsidies are needed to implement the ￿rst best under
incomplete contracts. The intuition behind (21) is that e¢ ciency is restored by a subsidy
that aligns the production costs borne by the upstream divisions to their share of total
surplus.
To summarize, we can write:
26Proposition 4 With complete contracts welfare is maximized through a subsidy to innova-
tion only. With incomplete contracts welfare maximization also requires a subsidy to o⁄shored
production.
VI Conclusion
We have used an endogenous growth model of North-South o⁄shoring with heterogeneous
￿rms to study its dynamic and static e⁄ects on the economy when contracts are incomplete
in the South. In so doing, we have modelled o⁄shoring as the geographical fragmentation of
a ￿rm￿ s production chain between a home upstream division and a foreign downstream one.
We have shown that, when contracts are incomplete, the possibility of o⁄shoring may have
favorable implications for economic growth. The key parameter regulating the growth e⁄ect
of o⁄shoring is the bargaining power of the upstream division through an inverted U-shaped
relation. While a larger upstream bargaining weight unambiguously promotes o⁄shoring, it
(hence increased o⁄shoring) only stimulates growth up to a critical level. Under complete
contracts, o⁄shoring has no impact whatsoever on growth. The reason for this is that under
complete contracts, o⁄shoring evenly augments the pro￿tability of R&D and production,
whereas with incomplete contracts the gains in pro￿tability are biased towards R&D.
Whether o⁄shoring with incomplete contracts also increases consumption depends on ￿rm
heterogeneity. For example, when productivity draws are Pareto distributed, consumption
increases when there are a lot of unproductive ￿rms and very few productive ones.
In terms of welfare, while with complete contracts the market outcome is ine¢ cient due
to R&D spillovers only, with incomplete contracts the fact that o⁄shored upstream divisions
27underproduce generates an additional source of ine¢ cieny. Hence, whereas with complete
contracts e¢ ciency can be restored through a subsidy to R&D only, with incomplete contracts
a production subsidy to o⁄shored upstream divisions is needed too.
Contrary to the existing literature, our study uses the industry dynamics of ￿rm organi-
zation to reveal the possibility of adverse long term e⁄ects of o⁄shoring for the North. In
addition, it emphasizes the role of ￿rm heterogeneity for the social gains from o⁄shoring.
This raises the question whether analyses on the consequences of o⁄shoring based on real
wages can fully absorb the mechanisms through which it in￿ uences the economy performance.
Our analysis has its limitation and leaves much work for future research on the issue.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
Here we provide a formal proof of Proposition 2 in three steps. First, we prove that
stronger contract enforcement in the South increases the relative size of o⁄shorers (d(ro=e r)=d! >
0). Second, we prove that the elasticity of o⁄shorers￿market share to the quality of the con-
tractual environment (dlnso=dln!) is strictly positive and ￿nite at both ! = 0 and ! = 1.
Third, we use these results to prove that there exists a unique threshold value for the bar-
gaining weight of upstream divisions ! such that d￿=d! > (<)0 and, thus, dgs=d! > (<)0 if
and only if ! falls below (above) that value.











= (1 ￿ !)￿’o (1 + (1 ￿ !)(￿ ￿ 1))
￿￿2
￿￿1 > 0
31Since ’￿ is an increasing function of !, the average productivity of inshorers e ’v is a





































is granted by the fundamental theorem of calculus. Moreover, since ’￿ is an increasing
function of !, the relative size of o⁄shorers with respect to the average producer ro=e r

































































































32Then the elasticity of o⁄shorers￿market share so to the quality of the contractual























as derived in the previous section. Accordingly
dlnso
dln!
= [1 + (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ !)so]
dlnG(’￿)
dln!
+ (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ so)





+ (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ so)
where dlnG(’￿)=dln’￿ is the elasticity of the extensive margin, i.e. the percentage
change in the fraction of o⁄shorers when the cuto⁄ changes by one per cent. Given
’



















1 + (1 ￿ !)(￿ ￿ 1)
so
dlnG(’￿)
dln’￿ + (1 ￿ so)
￿
In the limit, this implies that at ! = 0 the elasticity of o⁄shorers￿market share to the





dln’￿ + (￿ ￿ 1) > 0
33since ’￿ = 0 (all ￿rms o⁄shore), whereas at ! = 1 it equals
dlnso
dln!







since ’￿ = ’o. Hence, dlnso=dln! is strictly positive and ￿nite at both ! = 0 and
! = 1.
3. The bargaining weight ! a⁄ects the growth rate through various channels funneled
through the impact of ￿ on gs. To disentangle these channels, we use (10) and (11) to
rewrite the share ￿ of expenditures accruing to the downstream divisions of o⁄shorers
as
￿ = (1 ￿ !)
Eo
E











where e ’o ￿ !’o is o⁄shored productivity and e ’ is the average (o⁄shored and inshored)
productivity as de￿ned in (10). Recall equation (17). While the ￿rst term on the RHS
is falling with a marginal increase in !, the second term on the RHS (change in the
overall share of expenditures accruing to o⁄shorers) depends on the sign of dso=d!.
This adjustment takes place along two margins: the relative number of o⁄shorers as
determined by G(’￿) ("extensive margin") and their relative size with respect to the












where e r = A~ p1￿￿. The impact of larger ! is positive on both margins. Since a larger bar-
gaining weight of upstream divisions alleviates their underproduction of intermediates,
as ! rises not only more producers decide to o⁄shore, but also o⁄shorers become larger.
Along the extensive margin, by (6) we have d’￿=d! > 0 and thus dG(’￿)=d! > 0.

























which, given d’￿=d! > 0 and dG(’￿)=d’￿ > 0, is an increasing function of ! (see proof
that @ (ro=e r)=@! > 0 in Step 1). Hence, we can conclude that dso=d! > 0, which, given
(17), implies that improved contract enforcement in the South has ambiguous e⁄ects
on ￿ and, therefore, on gs. To shed light on such ambiguity, we can manipulate (17) to
show that a higher bargaining weight of upstream divisions promotes growth when the
elasticity of the o⁄shorers￿market share so to ! is larger than the ratio between their







If the reverse is true, a higher bargaining weight of upstream divisions hampers growth.
Note that the values achieved by dlnso=dln! at ! = 0 and at ! = 1 are both strictly
positive and ￿nite provided that the elasticity of the extensive margin dlnG(’￿)=dln’￿
is also positive and ￿nite, as in the case of all the commonly used families of cumulative
density functions (see proof in Step 2). Then, since !=(1 ￿ !) equals zero at ! = 0
and goes to in￿nity when ! goes to one, there must exist a threshold value of ! below
which the inequality (A2) holds and above which it is violated. Hence, there exists
a unique threshold value for the bargaining weight of upstream divisions ! such that
d￿=d! > (<)0 and, thus, dgs=d! > (<)0 if and only if ! falls below (above) that value.
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